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¶1

¶2

A formidable problem faces urban populations in developing countries today, as
seventy- five percent “live[] in informal housing: dwellings which have been constructed
without the required permission, without the full title to land . . . [but] provide shelter to
1.5 billion people, or a quarter of the world’s population.”1 Zimbabwe contributes to
these figures, and its most recent land reform program to “clean up” its cities – Operation
Murambatsvina – has displaced over 700,000 men, woman, and children who lived in
informal housing. 2 In its aftermath, over one- hundred thousand families were rendered
homeless. 3 Though the Government of Zimbabwe, under the rule of President Robert
Mugabe, has recognized “the right of every one to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including [] food, clothing and housing . . . .,”4 it has done little to
comply with its international obligations and rectify the humanitarian crises now facing a
vast sector of its population. 5
Notwithstanding that the majority of demolished dwellings were informal housing
settlements and therefore illegal, the Government acknowledged that it could “either
upgrade any ‘illegal’ settlements or resettle the people on other planned residential sites
in line with international law.”6 The Government chose neither, and issued an
enforcement order for the Operation five days after the demolitions in the capital City of
Harare had already begun. 7 The devastating consequences could have been minimized if
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1
THEO R.G. VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY 85 (2002).
2
U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to
Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, 7, delivered to the U.N. Human
Settlements Programme, (July 22, 2005) (Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka) available at
http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Report].
3
Id. at 85.
4
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11(1), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (accession by Zimb. May 13, 1991)
[hereinafter CESCR].
5
The U.N. Special Envoy estimates that “the total population indirectly affected by the Operation [is] 2.56
million.” U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 34.
6
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, “CLEAR THE FILTH”: M ASS EVICTIONS AND DEMOLITIONS IN ZIMBABWE , A
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH BRIEFING PAPER 9 (2005),
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0905/zimbabwe0905.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights
Watch].
7
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 58. The Operation began May 19 and the enforcement order was issued
May 24, 2005.
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relevant agencies had provided “genuine consultation with affected persons and groups”8
prior to the demolitions being carried out. 9 This did not happen.
Though state-controlled newspapers have recently spun the Operation as a
preemptive move to prevent a revolution “being planned and funded by . . . Western
countries,” it is evident that the Government’s actions are consistent with its trend of
“dismiss[ing] [human rights] allegations as part of a western neo-colonial conspiracy . . .
.”10 Local non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”) and human rights lawyers in
Zimbabwe have reported that the Operation was largely a move to punish those who
voted for the opposition party in March 2005 11 and to “prevent mass uprisings against
deepening food insecurity and worsening economic conditions.”12 Despite the conflicting
rhetoric, it is clear that the Government has failed to comply with domestic and
international obligations prohibiting forced evictions, including the right to adequate
alternative housing, access to food, water, and health care 13 for the six percent of its
population adversely affected. 14
This article analyzes the international and domestic legal doctrines implicated by
the human rights violations arising from Operation Murambatsvina, namely the right to
adequate alternative housing, and argues that international intervention is required to
uphold the rule of law and assist Zimbabwe in recovery. Section I outlines the
Government’s alleged rationale for the Operation, as well as the context, nature, and
humanitarian consequences of the demolitions. Section II explores Zimbabwe’s
international treaty obligations protecting individuals’ right to housing and prohibitions
against forced eviction in an area of international law still under development. 15 Sections
III and IV evaluate Zimbabwe’s domestic doctrines and legal framework, and argues that
although the Zimbabwe Constitution is informed by international human rights norms
and Zimbabwean courts have conceded that “international law is . . . the law of
[Zimbabwe],”16 applying its international obligations domestically is impractical because
the judiciary has ceased functioning independently. Section V assesses whether the
human rights abuses resulting from the Operation have reached the level of a
humanitarian crises that would justify direct international intervention, particularly in
light of “the emerging norm of a [collective] responsibility to protect.”17 The article
concludes with recommendations for international intervention in the form of assistance
with implementing a sustainable recovery program, and a means of judicial recourse for
the human rights abuses suffered by Zimbabweans at the hands of their government.
8

General Comment No. 4: The Human Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)), Report of the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6th Sess., at para 8(a), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 4].
9
Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 19.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 14.
12
Id.
13
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 7, 39. The U.N. Special Envoy estimates that 79,500 people over the age of
15 living with HIV/AIDS have been displaced, with basic HIV/AIDS services being discontinued as a
result of the Operation.
14
Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 1.
15
Nick Dancaescu, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 FLA. J. INT ’L L. 615, 638 (2003).
16
Barker McCormack Ltd. v. Gov’t of Kenya, (1983) 2 Z.L.R. 72, 77.
17
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Changes, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf
[hereinafter Shared Responsibility Report].
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I. OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA
A. Context of the Operation

¶5

¶6

Since gaining independence from British colonialism in 1980, Zimbabwe has been
governed by South African revolutionary Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe Africa
Nationalist Union Patriotic Front (“ZANU-PF”) party. Initially viewed by the regional
and international community as an exemplary South African country capable of
successfully transforming from apartheid rule to a representative democracy, Mugabe’s
Government was soon characterized by corruption, oppression, violence, and policies of
wealth redistribution that caused skyrocketing inflation. 18 The downward trend began in
1990 when President Mugabe implemented hyper-aggressive land reform programs
allowing the Government to seize white-owned farms without compensation. 19 The
purpose of these programs was to redistribute white-owned commercial farms to native
Zimbabweans who were formerly dispossessed and forbidden from owning property
under the colonial regime. 20 Though land redistribution was necessary to overcome the
inequitable ratio of white to black owned land, President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF
failed to consider that “[w]hite commercial farmers produced 90% of the country’s
food,”21 that the farming sector was the mainstay of exports and foreign exchange, and
provided 400,000 jobs. 22 Furthermore, dependence on untrained Black farmers to
immediately fill this void was not feasible. 23
Coupled with cash handouts to war veterans in 1997 24 and military intervention in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1998 to 2002, 25 the “fast-track” land
redistribution program provided the final blow from which the Zimbabwean economy has
yet to recover. The economic collapse and redistribut ion programs effectively caused an
exodus of unemployed Black rural farm workers into urban areas seeking employment.
As demand increased, “legal” housing became unaffordable and the number of houses in
violation of local building laws grew dramatically. 26 In addition, the informal business
sector has been mushrooming because legitimate employment opportunities became
unavailable. 27 The U.N. Special Envoy reports that prior to the demolitions “3 to 4
million Zimbabweans earned their living through informal sector employment,
supporting another 5 million people, while the formal sector employed [] 1.3. million
18

Why Gono’s ‘Turnaround’ Strategy May Fail, ZIMB. STANDARD , Oct. 9, 2005 (Reporting that current
inflation is at 264%, grossly up from the 8.49% inflation rate in 1985.); Lorna Davidson & Raj Purohit, The
Zimbabwean Human Rights Crises: A Collaborative Approach to International Advocacy, 7 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 108, 115-116 (2005).
19
A detailed analysis of the land reform program in Zimbabwe is beyond the scope of this paper. For an
in-depth analysis see Hasani Claxton, Land and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective Land
Reform Policy in South Africa, 8 M ICH. J. RACE & L. 529 (2003).
20
Dancaescu, supra note 16, at 619 (“700,000 black families lived on 16.2 million hectares, while 5,500
white farmers had rights to . . . 15.6 million hectares.”).
21
Claxton, supra note 19, at 541.
22
CIA World Factbook: Zimbabwe, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/zi.html#Econ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinafter CIA World Factbook].
23
Claxton, supra note 19, at 541.
24
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 16.
25
CIA World Factbook, supra note 22 (Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war “drained hundreds of millions
of dollars from the economy”).
26
Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 7.
27
Id.; CIA World Factbook, supra note 23. (The CIA reports an unemployment rate of 70% in Zimbabwe).
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people.”28 Although the informal businesses “rarely pay[ed] taxes or fees in direct
proportion to the services they use[d],” local authorities were collecting “substantial”
revenues and fees from the informal activities. 29
In 1995, the government of Zimbabwe officially noted the illegal housing and
informal business sector problem facing its urban areas in its initial State Party Report
issued to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (“ESCR Committee”). 30
In response, the ESCR Committee made clear its concern “about the precarious situation
of persons living in illegal structures or unauthorized housing,” but insisted that “persons
should not be subjected to forced evictions unless . . . done under conditions compatible
with the Covenant.”31 In disregard of the ESCR Committee’s response and threats of
tightened sanctions from the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, 32
government officials announced in the capital city of Harare on May 19, 2005 their
intention to destroy unlicensed businesses and “illegal” housing structures. 33
The notice given by local city council members and police “rang[ed] from [no
notice to] one or two days to a week”34 “to reorder the affairs which were put in place in a
period of 20 years.”35 Thereafter, police and security forces bulldozed informal trading
shops, housing structures, and arrested illegal traders beginning in Harare and extending
throughout the country – demolishing legal housing and businesses, and killing at least
six people in the process. 36 The hundreds of thousands of evictees were loaded into
trucks and shipped to transit camps that were inadequate to accommodate such large
numbers of people. 37
B. Human Rights Abuses

¶9

The Operation has further crippled Zimbabwe’s economy, as well as its social and
political structures, but the most hard- felt impact has been the human rights abuses
directly inflicted on its most vulnerable population – those already living in poverty and
barely making a living from the informal business sector; HIV/AIDS patients left with no
access to treatment; school aged children having their educations disrupted; and the
elderly left homeless with no support. As one victim of the Operation reported to an
Australian news source: “’ZANU-PF has killed us’ . . . as he explains that his shop was
destroyed in the demolitions, and now he’s supporting his family – including a disabled
28

U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 17. The U.N. Special Envoy also reports that the informal sector grew
from 20% in 1986 to 40% by 2004.
29
Id. at 22.
30
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Initial Report:
Zimbabwe, sec. 100(i), U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.28 (1995) [hereinafter Zimbabwe’s State Party Report]
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. These reports are the primary way the ESCR Committee
monitors compliance to provisions of the CESCR. State parties to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are required to send periodic reports to the ESCR Committee in
accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the CESCR.
31
Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Zimbabwe, para.
13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.12 (1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nef.
32
See Baffour Ankomah, Zimbabwe: A nation of many surprises, NEW A FRICAN, Oct. 1, 2005, at 52.
33
Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 12.
34
Id.
35
Innocent Mawire, Clean-Up Violated Basic Human Rights, ZIMB. INDEPENDENT , July 31, 2005.
36
Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 13.
37
Augustine Mukaro, Showdown Looms Over Human Rights, ZIMB. INDEPENDENT , Sept. 23, 2005.
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daughter – on about $50 a month.”38 This man, however, is fortunate not to have had his
home destroyed as “thousands of families were left unprotected in the open in the middle
of Zimbabwe’s winter . . . [and] families [] removed to transit camps . . . had no shelter or
cooking facilities and minimal food supplies, and sanitary facilities.”39
¶10
Deriving their numbers from “official” governmental sources, the U.N. Special
Envoy reported that 92,460 homes had been demolished, affecting 133,543 families, and
totaling nearly 569,685 individuals being rendered homeless. 40 The Envoy also reported
that approximately 32,538 informal business structures were destroyed, leaving 97,614
individuals unemployed. These numbers do not include an estimated 2.56 million people
“whose livelihoods are indirectly affected by, for example, loss of rental income and the
disruption of highly integrated and complex networks involved in the supply chain of the
informal economy.”41 Twenty percent of those directly affected are living with no shelter
and have nowhere to go, another twenty percent have been forced into “transit camps” in
rural areas, and the remaining sixty percent have either been taken in by friends or
families, or have sought temporary accommodations with churches or other community
shelters. 42 It was reported from a Zimbabwean newspaper that those without shelter are
staying in “mostly knee-high and unsightly makeshift structures made of . . . broken
asbestos sheets, wood, dirty plastics and cardboard boxes.”43
¶11
Since nearly a majority of those displaced are without alternative housing or
assistance, the humanitarian crisis is substantial. This includes “immediate need of tents,
blankets, food, water, sanitation and medical assistance,”44 all of which humanitarian
NGO’s have attempted to provide unsuccessfully due to bureaucratic hurdles and
governmental interference. 45 Exacerbating this difficulty is the fact that the government
is moving the displaced to secluded rural areas without notifying humanitarian agencies,
and when humanitarian aid does arrive the police are reported to have been forcibly
preventing food and water distribution. 46 This is disturbing considering children have
been seen feeding on rotten food left by vendors. 47 In addition, the lack of sanitized
water, coupled with a lack of medical care particularly within the transit camps, has led to
water borne outbreaks of dysentery and cholera, and pneumonia and tuberculosis for
those living without shelter. 48 The U.N. Special Envoy has reported an emerging
epidemic, “with reported deaths among displaced children due to respiratory
infections.”49
38

Zoe Daniel, Mugabe Government faces possible split, A USTL. BROADCASTING CORP ., Oct. 21, 2005.
State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2005.
40
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 32.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 35. One among many ironies stemming from the tragic demolition is that those who were
employed by the informal sector, and who had gotten loans to build legitimate housing now have no means
of repaying their loans.
43
Walter Marwizi, Clean Up Victims Win Court Reprieve, ZIMB. STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2005.
44
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 36.
45
U.S. Fed. News, supra note 39; Vusumuzi Sifile, SA Food Aid Bogged Down by Red Tape, ZIMB.
STANDARD, Aug. 28, 2005.
46
Barry Newhouse, Human Rights Group Says Zimbabwe Secretly Scattering Homeless, U.S FED. NEWS,
Aug. 20, 2005.
47
ZIMB. STANDARD, supra note 43.
48
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 37-38.
49
Id. at 38.
39

279

N O R T H W E S T E R N J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L H U M A N R I G H T S

[2007

C. The International Response
¶12

Although most Western powers, including the United States, United Kingdom and
the European Union, have condemned the Operation, African states have not directly
attacked Mugabe’s demolitions. 50 This is largely due to the fact that many African
leaders, including Nelson Mandela, view Mugabe “‘as a liberator of his nation in the
long, bitter struggle on the continent in which so many . . . suffered so much.’”51 Despite
the reluctance of neighboring states to condemn the Operation, the United States,
European Union, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
have tightened “travel and economic sanctions on Mugabe, members of his Cabinet and
his close allies in the armed forces and the judiciary,”52 further isolating Mugabe and
Zimbabwe from the international community. In the U.S., Representative Tom Lantos
(D-CA), ranking member of the House International Relations Committee, introduced a
bipartisan resolution condemning the Operation and its disregard for human rights, and
called on the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to continue withholding benefits from
Zimbabwe. 53
¶13
The sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Western states were initially implemented
following the land redistribution program, but have since been tightened to limit
economic aid and relations “in the area of trade, free circulation of capital, and free
circulation of persons.”54 Because the sanctions were largely targeted at Zimbabwean
heads of state and not the Zimbabwean economy or its people, the governments of the
U.S., U.K. and E.U. continue to provide food and medical aid to the compulsorily
displaced residents through delivery to local NGOs. 55 Additionally, in September 2005
the IMF chose not to continue withholding benefits to Zimbabwe, as that would further
affect its already destitute population. 56
D. Zimbabwe’s Justification for the Operation
¶14

The international community, humanitarian NGOs, and human rights lawyers
interpret the government’s justification for the Operation as a “‘smokescreen’ . . . that
had little to do with addressing the problem of informal structures and restoring order
within urban areas.”57 These groups view the Operation as a reaction to the parliamentary
elections in March 2005, where the Movement for Democratic Change (“MDC”) –
ZANU-PF’s strongest political opposition – had a high turnout in urban areas. 58 Yet even
after the U.N. Special Envoy distributed its report, the government of Zimbabwe
remained steadfast in declaring that “t he risk to public health and morality, national
50

Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 35.
Nat Hentoff, Mugabe’s shameful apologist, W ASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A19.
52
Tendai Farai, Zimbabwe on the Brink: Heart of Darkness, A DVERTISER (Austl.), July 16, 2005, at W07.
53
Rep. Lantos Introduces Bill Condemning Zimbabwe’s Wanton Destruction of Private Property, U.S. FED.
NEWS, July 29, 2005.
54
Paola A. Pillitu, European ‘Sanctions’ Against Zimbabwe’s Head of State and Foreign Minister: A Blow
to Personal Immunities of Senior State Officials?, 1 J. INT ’L CRIM. JUST . 453 (2003).
55
Sarah Williams, U.S. Envoy Affirms Solidarity with Zimbabwe’s Hungry, Homeless, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Aug. 16, 2005.
56
Ndimyake Mwakalyelye, IMF: Outlook ‘Bleak’ for Zimbabwe Without Major Policy Shifts, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005.
57
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 20.
58
Zoe Daniel, Mugabe Government faces possible split, A USTL. BROADCASTING CORP ., Oct. 21, 2005.
51
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security and the economy necessitated that the operation had to be undertaken without
further delay.”59 That Mugabe’s own Finance Minister conceded the Operation was “a
spontaneous exercise that had no budget,” was carried out in the face of international
condemnation and in the midst of economic paralysis, lends much credence to the notion
that it was a “deliberate attempt . . . to scatter opposition supporters into rural areas where
they [could not] mobilize against [ZANU-PF] – especially when they’re starving and
cold.”60
II. TREATY-BASED P ROTECTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY, HOUSING AND
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FORCED EVICTIONS
¶15

Because “human rights are correctly perceived as an instrument for the defense of
the vulnerable . . . [whereas] property rights have often been perceived as an instrument
to protect the rich and the powerful,”61 the human right to property has received mixed
reception among human rights specialists. Nonetheless, the right to adequate housing and
protection from forced evictions has received near universal acceptance as a fundamental
human right. Until recently, however, developing and applying a universally accepted
interpretation of these rights has been difficult, primarily because of the complexity of
reconciling property rights with the progressive goals of U.N. human rights treaties. The
obligations of states have therefore been unclear. 62 Committees to the major U.N.
conventions have since sought to clarify these rights by adopting specific interpretations,
guidelines, and due process procedures, which are embodied in resolutions that state
parties are obligated to follow before compulsory evictions may take place. In addition,
national and international jurisprudence continues to help clarify the guarantees of the
right to adequate housing and protection from forced evictions as enshrined in the major
U.N. and regional African human rights instruments.
¶16
International conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party, and that recognize a right
to adequate housing and protection from forced evictions, include, among others, 63 the
59

NEW A FRICAN, supra note 32.
A USTL. BROADCASTING CORP ., supra note 58; Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property be
Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF
ST
THE 21 CENTURY 471, 421 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds. 1996) (“Taking people’s property
is an effective form of persecution, of undermining the power and efficacy of a group, of designating an
individual or group as inferior and unprotected.”).
61
Banning, supra note 1, at 7.
62
Scott Leckie, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate
Housing: Towards an Appropriate Approach, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 522, 526 (1989).
63
The right to adequate housing is also enshrined in other international conventions. See Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969) (accession
by Zimb. May 13, 1991). Article 5(e) provides that “In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid
down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination in all of its forms and to guarantee the right to everyone, without distinction as to race,
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following
rights: . . . (e) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in particular . . . (iii) the right to housing.”; Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/180 (1980) (accession by Zimb. May 13, 1991). Article 14(2) provides that “States Parties shall
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and,
in particular, shall ensure to such women the right . . . (h) to enjoy adequate living conditions particularly in
relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.” U.N.
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1959, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
60
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”) 64 ; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) 65 ; and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”) 66 . The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 67 is also implicated, because it obliges
state parties to respect an individual’s freedom of movement and prohibits arbitrary
interference with an individual’s home.
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
¶17

As the oldest promulgation of universal human rights, the Universal Declaration,
adopted in 1948 by the U.N. General Assembly, sets forth the most widely accepted
provisions protecting individuals’ human rights vis-à-vis their state. The Universal
Declaration is a non-binding resolution, but “although the declaration in itself may not be
a legal document involving legal obligations . . .it contains an authoritative interpretation
of the ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ which do constitute an obligation . . .
binding upon the Members of the United Nations,”68 stemming from the U.N. Charter,
and therefore enforceable by the U.N. Security Council. 69 Furthermore, the provisions of
the Universal Declaration have been interpreted as customary international law. 70 The
right of private property ownership is extended in Article 17, which provides: “(1)
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2)
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”71
¶18
On its face, Article 17 extends a universal right of each individual to the ownership
of private property, but in the context of Zimbabwe its practical affect stops short for two
reasons. First, because “national laws [in Zimbabwe were] mostly ignored after
independence, leading to [] rapid formation of backyard extensions now dubbed
illegal,”72 there is a question as to whether technically “illegal” property comes under the
protection of “the right to own property.” This right, however, is not exclusive to real
property, and proof of formal ownership was held by the European Court of Human
Rights not to bar the right to protection of informally owned property. 73 Second, the right
16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). Principle 4 stipulates that “[t]he child shall enjoy the benefits of social
security . . . The child shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services.”
64
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 17 [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
65
CESCR, supra note 4, at art. 11(1).
66
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, 22(2), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
67
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), at art. 12.
68
H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT :
LAW POLITICS M ORALS, 147, 151 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2000).
69
See Egon Schwelb, An Instance of Enforcing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Action by the
Security Council, 22 INT ’L & COMP L.Q. 161 (1973).
70
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (The Second Circuit recognized the
Universal Declaration as customary international law in the context of freedom from torture, and noted that
since 1977 “eighteen nations have incorporated the Universal Declaration into their own constitutions.”);
Jonathan Shirley, The Role of International Human Rights and the Law of Diplomatic Protection in
Resolving Zimbabwe’s Land Crisis, 27 B.C. INT ’L & COMP . L. REV. 161, 166 (2004).
71
Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 17.
72
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 56.
73
See Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301A Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994) (Interpreting Article I of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which guarantees the right to
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not to be “arbitrarily deprived” of property is ill-defined in international law. 74 But one
can presume that “arbitrary deprivation” would be defined as the failure of a state to give
fair “notice and an opportunity to be heard”75 as the U.S. Supreme Court defined it in
Fuentes v. Shevin.76 This is analogous to the ESCR Committee’s Comment No. 7 due
process requirement that a state provide “genuine consultation with affected persons and
groups”77 before depriving an individual of her property.
¶19
If one adopts these interpretations of the “right to own property” and protection
from “arbitrary deprivation” as applicable to the construction of Article 17, it is evident
that the compulsory evictions contravened these rights. Unable to afford “legal” housing,
urban dwellers built “backyard extensions” onto existing “legal” plots and paid plot
owners rent for their accommodations. 78 This not only “proliferated as a form of
affordable rental housing . . . [but provided] a source of income for [plot] owners.”79
Under the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation, this would qualify as
legitimate property ownership. In addition, adequate notice and genuine consultation
before the evictions took place were not provided to the evictees before the demolitions
began. 80 For instance, where “notice” appeared in a local newspaper five days after
demolitions began81 and “’consultations’ were undertaken because . . . people were
informed . . . through their monthly bills, which included a fine levied on owners who
had illegal structures,”82 an “arbitrary deprivation” of property was clearly carried out.
B. The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
¶20

The obligation to respect and protect the right to housing exists in the CESCR and
as a signatory Zimbabwe is bound by its provisions. 83 The right to housing is found in
Article 11(1), which states: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food clothing and housing . . . .”84 The supervisory committee – ESCR

property, to not require proper title documents or proper compliance with legislation when a state
threatened to evict or interfere with peaceful enjoyment of monasteries established in the 9th and 13th
centuries.).
74
Shirley, supra note 70, at 166.
75
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
76
Id.
77
General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art. 11.1): Forced evictions, Report of the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16th Sess., at para 8, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV
(1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7].
78
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 25.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 58, 60.
81
Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 12.
82
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 60.
83
Zimbabwe acceded to the CESCR on May 13, 1991. See Michael Dennis & David Stewart, Justiciability
of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should there be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 A M. J. INT ’L L. 462, 476 (2004) Unlike the
ICCPR, the rights set forth in the CESCR “are not described as obligations to be performed by states parties
in full and at once. Rather, they represent goals to be achieved progressively,” as specified in Article 2(1).
This is evident in the fact that the CESCR has no individual complaints mechanism that would make
violations of specific rights justiciable.
84
CESCR, supra note 4, art. 11(1).
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Committee 85 – in its General Comments Nos. 3 and 9 outline states’ obligations under the
CESCR, requiring each party to use “all means at its disposal to give effect to the rights
recognized in the Covenant . . . [including its] legal and administrative systems.”86 For
example, “a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations
under the Covenant.”87 Because in the context of Zimbabwe it is the agents of the state
and not a third party infringing the rights of its citizens, “the right to an adequate standard
of . . . housing” can be seen as a negative duty on the government of Zimbabwe to
“respect” or “abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity of the individual or
infringes on his/her recognized human rights . . .,”88 or put more simply, “duties to avoid
depriving.”89
¶21
Article 11(1) has been carefully defined and interpreted by the ESCR Committee in
its General Comment No. 4. 90 Comment No. 4 specifies four duties obligating states to
prevent forced evictions. These requirements include: (1) “all persons [must] possess a
degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction,
harassment and other threats”91 ; (2) “demonstrat[ion] [through State Party Reports] that it
has taken whatever steps are necessary, either alone or on the basis of international
cooperation, to ascertain the full extent of . . . those living in ‘illegal’ settlements, [and]
those subject to forced evictions and low- income groups”92 ; (3) the right to domestic legal
remedies including “(a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or
demolitions through the issuance of court-ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures
seeking compensation following an illegal eviction;”93 and (4) concludes with a
declaration that “instances of forced eviction are prima facie incompatible with the
requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional
circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law.”94 The
“exceptional circumstances” include “persistent behavior which threatens, harasses or
intimidates neighbors; persistent behavior which threatens public health or is manifestly
criminal behavior as defined by law . . . and illegal occupation of property without
compensation.”95 The government of Zimbabwe relies on these exceptions as justification
for the evictions under international law. 96
85

The ESCR Committee “seeks to achieve three principal objectives: (1) developing the normative content
of the rights recognized in the Covenant; (2) acting as a catalyst to state action in developing national
‘benchmarks’ and devising appropriate mechanisms for establishing accountability, and providing means of
vindication to aggrieved individuals and groups at the national level; and (3) holding states accountable at
the international level through the examination of reports.” Steiner et al., supra note 68, at 305.
86
General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant, Report of the U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19th Sess., at para. 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998).
87
General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, para.1), Report of the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., at para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990).
88
Banning, supra note 1, at 223.
89
Id.
90
General Comment No. 4, supra note 8.
91
Id. at para. 8(a).
92
Id. at para. 13.
93
Id. at para. 17.
94
Id. at para. 18.
95
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 59.
96
Id. at 60.
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While General Comment No. 4 provides “the most comprehensive international
statement of law on the right to adequate housing to date,”97 Comment No. 7 responds
directly to forced evictions and stipulates the procedures required by a state before and
after it carries out compulsory evictions. 98 Among those implicated are:
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b)
adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the
scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions . . .
[and] alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be
made available in reasonable time to all those affected; . . . (f) evictions
not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected
persons consent otherwise; (g) provisions of legal remedies; and (h)
provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to
seek redress from the courts; [and] evictions should not result in
individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other
human rights. 99

Even if these procedural requirements are satisfied, the evictions must be carried out in
“strict compliance” with other provisions of the CESCR, and the policy initiative must be
reasonable and proportionate in light of the harm caused. 100
¶23
The case for the compulsorily displaced lies in the argument that none of these
procedural requirements have been complied with, and the policy initiative to clean up
Zimbabwe’s cities does not outweigh the right to security from compulsory evictions
when there was no infrastructure in place to accommodate the displaced. As mentioned
in the application of the Universal Declaration, the due process requirements of “genuine
consultations” and fair notice were not affected prior to the evictions taking place, nor
were the evictees provided with information on the proposed evictions. 101 In addition,
the Operation was carried out in the middle of Zimbabwe’s winter season, leaving
families exposed to the weather with no alternative accommodations. 102 But the most
fundamental of these procedural violations is the fact that the Zimbabwean judiciary has
been dismissive of complaints seeking injunctions prevent ing forced evictions and
compensation for the destruction of homes and private property. 103 Though some
homeless evictees have recently been granted a court order preventing their removal by
the government from “transit camps” until adequate accommodations are provided, they
still remain homeless with no alternative housing or basic services. 104
¶24
The government of Zimbabwe carried out the evictions without following any of
the procedural requirements specified in the General Comments interpreting Article
11(1), but most importantly did not adhere to its “duties to avoid depriving.” However,
because the ESCR Committee lacks “enforcement powers, leaving it primarily a doctrine
97

Mayra Gomez & Bret Thiele, Housing Rights are Human Rights, 32 HUM. RTS. 2, 3 (2005).
General Comment No. 7, supra note 77.
99
Id. at para. 15.
100
Id. at para. 14.
101
U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 60.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
ZIMB. STANDARD, supra note 43.
98
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involved in data collection and recommendations,”105 it is unlikely that Article 11(1)
violations can be rectified by the ESCR committee alone. In an analogous case where the
government of Nigeria undertook large scale forced evictions, for example, the ESCR
Committee merely drafted its concluding observations, 106 had them circulated in Nigeria
by NGOs, issued a press release, put them on the U.N. website and included them in the
Committee’s Annual Report; no additional actions were undertaken to compel Nigerian
officials to adhere to its CESCR obligations. 107 Because the ESCR Committee “has yet to
show that it has the capability to appropriately and comprehensively [enforce] the right to
adequate housing . . . [despite] the procedural changes adopted by the committee . . .
[that] permit a legal determination of its contents,”108 it is left to the government of
Zimbabwe to recognize its obligations under the CESCR. This, however, is not feasible
when the Zimbabwean judiciary has ceased to function independently. 109
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
¶25

It is argued that the right to property ownership is civil and political, while “[t]he
right to land for survival, the right to development, and the right to self-determination of
oppressed people to natural resources are all social and economic rights.”110 Nonetheless,
both civil and political, and social, economic and cultural rights are interdependent
insofar as they both require states to realize “that every woman, man and child has the
right to a secure place to live in peace and dignity, which includes the right not to be
evicted unlawfully, arbitrarily or on a discriminatory basis from their home, land or
community.”111 The ICCPR is significant in the context of Zimbabwe because it
explicitly identifies in Article 2(3) the right to a remedy within a state party’s domestic
legal framework, and allows individuals to bring a complaint against the state if it has
accepted the jurisdiction of the U.N. Human Rights Committee by signing the Optional
Protocol specified in Article 41. 112 Zimbabwe acceded to the ICCPR on August 13, 1991.
It has not, however, signed the first or second Optional Protocols and therefore does not

105

Dancaescu, supra note 16, at 638; see also Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 A M. J. INT ’L L. 462 (2004).
106
Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Nigeria, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23 (1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nef.
107
Steiner et al., supra note 68, at 306.
108
Leckie, supra note 62, at 534.
109
Dancaescu, supra note 15, at 637 (“As is the case in Zimbabwe, when a judiciary ceases to function
independently and no international civil or constitutional court exists, there is no oversight, other than that
of a despot of a nation, to find a balance between the right to development and the right to security in
property, unless the international community intervenes.”).
110
John M. Nading, Property Under Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY INT ’L L.
REV. 737, 786 (2002).
111
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on the Prohibition of forced evictions, para. 3, U.N.
Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV (2004), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4RES -2004-28.doc [hereinafter Forced Evictions Resolution].
112
ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 2 para. 3(b) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes . . . To
ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the State, and to develop possibilities of judicial remedy.”).
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“recognize the competence” of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider
individual complaints. 113
¶26
The ICCPR addresses the right to be free from the deprivation of property in
Article 17, which provides: “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . (2) Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”114 The right to
freedom of movement and “freedom to choose [a] residence” is extended in Article 12,
with limited exceptions that “are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.”115 In accordance
with the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 27, the exceptions provided
in Article 12(3) are to be interpreted narrowly, and “[t]he laws authorizing the application
of restrictions . . . may not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their
execution.”116
¶27
The Human Rights Committee has responded to the problem of forced evictions in
a 2004 Resolution. 117 The Resolution recommends, inter alia, that “Governments []
provide immediate restitution, compensation and/or appropriate and sufficient alternative
accommodation . . .to persons and communities that have been forcibly evicted,
following mutually satisfactory negotiations with the affected persons or groups . . .,” and
most importantly “that all Governments ensure that any eviction that is otherwise deemed
lawful is carried out in a manner that does not violate any of the human rights of those
evicted.”118 The Resolution, therefore, makes explicit the positive obligations of states
parties to the ICCPR to provide due process, remedies, and prevention of further human
rights abuses if the evictions are indeed “legal.”
¶28
Zimbabwe did not fulfill its obligations under the ICCPR during the Operation.
When armed Zimbabwean police “forced [the residents] to destroy their own houses, [] at
gunpoint . . . [and] destroyed [the homes] by bulldozers . . . or burnt and razed [them] to
the ground,”119 without restitution, compensation or alternative housing, it can safely be
said that an “arbitrary or unlawful interference with [the residents’] privacy, family, [and]
home” was carried out. Further, by “compelling people to move to the rural areas against
their wishes,”120 there was clearly a violation of the evictee’s right to the freedom of
movement and choice of residence. As mentioned, Article 2(3) requires that these
victims receive “an effective remedy” from “competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities,”121 and because Zimbabwe acceded to the ICCPR before 1993, it is
a self-executing treaty, and therefore requires a “competent” tribunal to remedy the

113

See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Status of Ratifications of the
Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 09 June 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf;
ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 41.
114
Id. at art. 17.
115
Id. at art. 12(1), (3).
116
General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement (Art. 12), Hum. Rts. Comm., 67th Sess., at para. 13,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
117
Forced Evictions Resolution, supra note 111.
118
Id. at para. 4, 5.
119
Human Rights Report, supra note 6, at 2.
120
Id. at 38.
121
ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 2(3).
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government’s human rights violations resulting from the Operation. 122 The victims are
therefore entitled to an effective remedy.
D. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
¶29

The African Charter stands as a regional human rights instrument that is concurrent
with the U.N.’s promulgation of universal human rights specified in the Universal
Declaration, CESCR, and the ICCPR. The African Charter was adopted by the
Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) in 1986 and ratified by Zimbabwe that same
year. 123 Article 30 established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“African Commission”), 124 which unlike the ESCR Committee, functions as a quasiadjudicatory body that hears individual and state party complaints with the goal of
“seek[ing] an amicable settlement between the parties.”125 However, in 1998 the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted a Protocol to the
African Charter, entering into force on January 2004, which established an African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”). 126 Although the African Court and
African Commission’s general responsibilities “appear to be in competition with each
other,” the African Court will hear “disputes ‘concerning the interpretation and
application’ of the Charter, Protocol, and any other relevant human rights instrument
ratified by the States concerned.”127 As of now, however, the African Court is not yet
fully operational.
¶30
The African Charter addresses the right to property in Article 14, which states:
“[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the
interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with
the provisions of appropriate laws.”128 Article 14 is peculiar, however, because it
subordinates the “guarantee” of property rights to national law in the second clause, and
thereby “permits states, in their nearly unrestrained discretion, to restrict the rights
guaranteed by the Charter.”129 Furthermore, the “right to property” is ill-defined in the
African Charter and there are no provisions that specifically protect against forced
evictions. Although displaced victims may bring a “communication” to the African
Commission to seek redress for other human rights violations resulting from the forced

122

Zimb. Const. § 111B(2). International human rights treaties acceded to before 1993 do not require
parliamentary approval, and are therefore self-executing.
123
Shirley, supra note 70, at 167.
124
African Charter, supra note 66, at art 30. Article 30 created the African Commission to be established
within the OAU, with the role of “promot[ing] human and peoples’ rights and [to] ensure their protection in
Africa.”
125
Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW
POLITICS M ORALS 926 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2000).
126
African Commission, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html; for an in-depth explanation of the Court and its
procedures see Association for the Prevention of Torture, The African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Jan. 2000), http://www.apt.ch/africa/African%20Court.pdf.
127
Steiner et al., supra note 68, at 936.
128
African Charter, supra note 66, at art. 14.
129
Shirley, supra note 70, at 168.
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evictions, until the African Court is operative, the African Charter affords very little
protection for the property rights of the compulsorily displaced. 130
III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
¶31

The Bangalore Principles, adopted in 1988 at a colloquium by Commonwealth
jurists from around the world in Bangalore, India, provide judicial standards and methods
by which a state may, through practical means, incorporate its international human rights
obligations into its domestic legal framework. 131 The Principles would ideally be the
starting point for any discussion on the domestic enforceability of international treaty
obligations. However, two fundamental prerequisites must be satisfied before the
methods specified in the Principles can be realized. First, the executive and legislative
branches must abstain from coercing or threatening a state’s judiciary and its political
autonomy. Second, a state’s judiciary must function independently from the executive
and legislative branches. As discussed more fully below, Zimbabwean officials continue
to experience coercive action by the executive and a lack of judicial independence.
Therefore, the Principles are of little practical use to the situation in Zimbabwe.
¶32
The only reference to international law in relation to municipal law in the
Constitution of Zimbabwe (“Constitution”) is found in Section 111B, which provides that
“any convention, treaty or agreement acceded to, concluded or executed . . . shall not
form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated into the law by or
under an Act of Parliament.”132 This provision was an amendment to Section 111B and
therefore applies only to the conventions Zimbabwe entered into after 1993. 133 It is well
established that “a party [to a binding treaty] may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” as specified in article 27 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 134 Thus, by signing the CESCR, ICCPR,
and the African Charter, the fact that section 111B renders treaties non-self-executing “in
no way reduces or significantly postpones [Zimbabwe’s] legal obligations”135 specified
therein.
¶33
Though customary international law is not mentioned in the Constitution, the High
Court of Zimbabwe has ruled, prior to the amendment of section 111B, that “international
human rights norms will become part of [Zimbabwe’s] domestic human rights law.”136
Despite that immediately following Zimbabwe’s independence the government
progressively acceded to U.N. and regional human rights instruments, and courts and
130

Banning, supra note 1, at 61-62 (“The article is . . . not sufficiently clear as to the circumstances under
which the right [to property] may be restricted . . . In practice, confiscations do occur in Africa on a
substantial scale with little recourse to justice.”).
131
A discussion of The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct can be found in Michael Kirby, The Role
of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to International Human Rights Norms, 62 A USTL.
L.J. 514, 531-32 (1988); The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf [hereinafter
Bangalore Principles].
132
Zimb. Const. 111B(1)(b), amended by Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 12) Act, 1993, §
12(1).
133
Id.
134
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
135
Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 M ICH. J. INT ’L L. 406, 425 (1989).
136
A Juvenile v. The State (1990) 4 S.A. 151, 155 (Zimb.).
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legislatures were “free to adopt the international law rule even if doing so would [have]
invalidate[d] a provision of domestic legislation,”137 this has ceased to be the case.
Mugabe’s regime has continually shown “disdain for the rule of law where it runs counter
to his aims,” by actions such as “pack[ing] the [High Court] with party faithfuls” when
Mugabe felt that justices ruling in line with internationally accepted practices conflict
with his policy initiatives. 138 This presents a difficult challenge for advancing an
international human right to adequate housing and prevention of forced evictions within
Zimbabwe’s domestic legal framework. The following section will address the argument
for the incorporation of international obligations into Zimbabwe’s domestic legal
framework and the practical difficulties when the judiciary has ceased to function
independently.
A. Treaty Obligations as a Basis of Customary International Law
¶34

It is accepted customary international law that a state party to a binding multilateral
treaty is obligated to make domestic changes necessary to fulfill its international
obligations, including its incorporation into municipal law. 139 This rule of customary
international law has been accepted in the United States and elsewhere, and is the
underlying tenant of the Bangalore Principles. For instance, in an interpretation of a U.N.
Charter provision describing the trusteeship system, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. U.S. Dep. Of Interior, 140 noted that
The extent to which an international agreement establishes affirmative and
judicially enforceable obligations without implementing legislation must
be determined in each case by reference to many contextual factors: the
purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence of
domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct
implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement
methods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences of selfor non-self-execution. 141
Although this is a default doctrine applied to the question of whether a treaty is selfexecuting in the U.S., failure by “competent” authorities in Zimbabwe to adopt similar
reasoning as an exception to the Constitution’s non-self-execution clause would deprive
the compulsorily evicted residents of the internationally recognized human right to
adequate housing and prohibition of forced evictions, thereby undermining the purpose of
“promot[ing] universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms” as envisioned by the Universal Declaration. 142
137

Michael G. Bochenek, Compensation for Human Rights Abuses in Zimbabwe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 483, 548 n 133 (1993).
138
Nading, supra note 110, at 788-89.
139
Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical
Framework, 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 219, 221 (1985); see Bangalore Principles, supra note 131 at para. 3.
140
502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
141
Id. at 97 (citing M. M CDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. M ILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF A GREEMENTS AND
W ORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967)).
142
Universal Declaration, supra note 64, at para. 5.
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Further, it has been contended that all of the rights enumerated in the Universal
Declaration, including Article 17(2)’s prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of property,
“has ‘the attributes of jus cogens.’”143 Though arguably “an overly enthusiastic
assertion,”144 the Universal Declaration and other binding human rights conventions have
been used numerous times to interpret national statutes in cases giving rise to human
rights violations in the U.S. and elsewhere; evincing widespread and representative
participation in the agreement[s].’”145 Despite courts in Zimbabwe being “asked to . . .
‘uphold and to enforce discriminatory laws: at one time to be an instrument of justice and
at another to be an instrument of oppression’,”146 the Universal Declaration, CESCR, and
the ICCPR should provide “competent” tribunals clear guidance in the face of oppressive
or discriminatory laws and actions by state officials. Provisions of the CESCR and
ICCPR are not only legally binding international law for member states, but as a matter
of customary international law, the Zimbabwean parliament and courts must utilize these
instruments “to determine [the] context and reach of rights guaranteed by domestic
law.”147
¶36
There is one fundamental prerequisite before this “infusionist” approach can be
used to inform domestic legislation and interpret constitutional provisions to be
concurrent with international human rights law, as specified in the Bangalore
Principles. 148 This is the requirement of an independent judiciary that is not coerced by
the executive and that is willing to supplement municipal law and statutory interpretation
with international human rights law. 149 Although Zimbabwean courts were once able to
“refer to international human rights norms in order to give flesh to domestic legal
provisions,”150 since 2000 “activist” judges and those exhibiting independence from
Mugabe and ZANU-PF have been removed, forced to resign, physically assaulted, and
arrested. 151
¶37
This not only makes it impossible for victims of the Operation to bring a direct
cause of action against responsible officials under justiciable guarantees in the
Constitution – particularly the “Protection from deprivation of property” of Section 16 152
– but also impedes any hope of a Zimbabwean court applying international human rights
standards so that the Constitution and domestic laws conform to Zimbabwe’s obligations
143

Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
367, 395 (1985).
144
Id.
145
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations
in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449, 491, 513 n.205.
146
Enoch Dumbutshena (former Chief Justice of Zimbabwe), Role of the Judge in Advancing Human
Rights, 18 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1298 (1992) (quoting an address by Mr. Arthur Chaskalson, National
Director, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg, at a Bar Dinner in Harare, April 1989).
147
Lillich, supra note 143, at 408.
148
Bochenek, supra note 137, at 515.
149
Id. at 524.
150
Id. at 519 (quoting Geoffrey Feltoe, Towards a Stronger Human Rights Culture in Zimbabwe: The
Special Role of Lawyers, 7-8 ZIMB. L. RE V. 134 (1989-90).).
151
Davidson et al., supra note 19, at 118; Heather Boyle, The Land Problem: What Does the Future Hold
for South Africa’s Reform Program?, 11 IND. INT ’L & COMP . L. REV. 665, 690-92 (2001). This began as a
result of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which allowed the government to take white-owned farm land
without compensation. Courts began holding that this was illegal under the Constitution and ordered
squatters to leave. Coercive measures were then taken by Mugabe to curtail such judicial “activism.”
152
Zimb. Const. ch. III, § 16.
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under international law. This is particularly the case when an issue involves a
governmental policy or ruling favoring the MDC; as one High Court Justice was detained
without food, clothing and medication after holding a government official in contempt for
not adhering to a court order, while another was beaten after ruling in favor of MDC
members. 153 Moreover, as discussed below, Section 16(a)(ii) of the Constitution gives an
extremely broad exception to government acquisition of property, rendering the
“protection from deprivation of property” mostly symbolic. 154 Under present
circumstances, it is doubtful any Zimbabwean Justice would uphold the rule of law at the
expense of his life and freedom, no matter the extent of human rights abuses involved.
IV. ZIMBABWE’S DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
¶38

The Zimbabwean common law system comes from South Africa, which is derived
from Roman civil law and Dutch common law, and influenced by English common
law. 155 Judges in Zimbabwe ideally observe the doctrine of stare decisis and apply the
law on a case-by-case basis. 156 When interpreting the Constitution, particularly the
Declaration of Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe generally gives high regard to
decisions of other Commonwealth courts, including Australia, Canada, India, and the
United States. 157 The Constitution of Zimbabwe was entered into force shortly after
independence from Britain on April 18, 1980. The Declaration of Rights, found in
Chapter III of the Constitution, was largely taken from the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 158 and provides for the protection from
governmental interference with property in Section 16. Both Section 16 and the Regional
Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 extend procedural safeguards, but still “[n]o law
exists in Zimbabwe that prohibits arbitrary evictions [per se] and grants a measure of
protection of tenure to the persons who could be affected.”159
¶39
It is commonly recognized in Roman-Dutch law that a person who is unlawfully
deprived of his property must be restored to his previous position, and the act of
dispossession or spoliation by government officials in an unlawful manner – against the
will of the possessor – gives the dispossessed the right to a remedy. 160 Therefore, “[s]tate
officials who cause squatters to surrender shacks under duress, commit acts of
spoliation,” but only “where the ‘spoilator’ was authorized by the Court or by statute to
dispossess the applicant”161 who seeks a remedy. Section 16, “Protection from
Deprivation of Property,” is consistent with this Roman-Dutch black letter law insofar as
it protects “property of any description or interest or right . . . [from being] comp ulsorily
153

Davidson et al., supra note 18, at 118-19.
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acquired”162 by the government without adherence to certain procedural safeguards.
Section 16(a)(i)-(ii), however, subordinates the protection from compulsory acquisition
by providing very broad exceptions, which would be adequate authorization “by statute”
under Roman-Dutch law to legally dispossess those informally housed. 163
¶40
The most far-reaching exception is found in Section 16(a)(ii), which states that:
in the case of any property, including land, or any interest or right therein,
that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interest of defense,
public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and
country planning or the utilization of that or any other property for a
purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section of the public. 164
¶41

Because Mugabe has couched the Operation in terms of preventing illegal activity,
restoring order in urban areas, and preventing “disorderly urbanization,” the compulsory
acquisitions fit squarely within the “public safety, public order, public morality, public
health” exceptions. These exceptions, however, are qualified by the conjunctive term
“and” with a list of procedural requirements, indicating that even if an exception applies,
the acquiring authority must satisfy the procedural requirements. These include
reasonable notice to any person affected by the acquisition, and fair compensation within
a reasonable time after acquiring the property. If the acquisition is contested, the
acquiring authority must apply to the High Court for an order confirming the acquisition,
and if an order is denied, it requires the return of the property. Finally, if the acquiring
authority has not complied with the procedures, subsection (f) creates a right of action for
the dispossessed. 165
¶42
Part V of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act (“Planning Act”) extends
additional due process safeguards in the case of compulsory acquisitions. 166 Section 34
requires authorities to issue a “prohibition order” giving thirty days notice before the
acquisitions take place, so that those “who [have] erected the unlawful structure[s] [have]
an opportunity to make presentations, and also [have] time to take steps to either
regularize their position or find an alternative place to reside . . . .”167 The “prohibition
order” was issued in no other city except Harare on May 24, 2005, while the demolitions
began on May 19, 2005. 168 In no instance did an evictee have an opportunity to
“regularize” their structure, as notice was given as little as a few hours before the
demolitions began, and some owners of homes and business who complied with the law
also had their structures destroyed. 169
¶43
A feat of judicial activism in the face of arbitrary mass forced evictions, which may
provide guidance to the Zimbabwe judiciary, was evidenced by the Supreme Court of
162
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India’s decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. 170 In Olga Tellis, the
Supreme Court of India overruled a statute that gave local officials the right to forcibly
evict urban dwellers occupying public property without due process safeguards. Unlike
the present context, however, India’s constitution does not include an explicit right to
property, and the Court therefore broadly interpreted the right to life to include the right
to housing. The Court found that to compulsorily evict “pavement dwellers” would
deprive them of their means of livelihood because of the proximity of the dwellings to
their place of employment. While the government argued that it was justified because of
the hazards of public safety and health, the Court remained resolute in declaring that if
you “[d]eprive a person of his right to livelihood [] you shall have deprived him of his
life,” and therefore “if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be
deprived of their livelihood.”171
¶44
In Zimbabwe, the Constitution explicitly guarantees the right of its citizens to be
protected from arbitrary deprivation of property. Yet in the process of implementing the
forced evictions, the government disregarded all of its own constitutional and statutory
protections from compulsory displacement, with absolutely no check by the judiciary.
Practically speaking, this renders Section 16 of the Constitution and Part V of the
Planning Act largely null and void, and reinforces the argument that “Zimbabwe is a
classic case of an authoritarian government clinging to power and using whatever
methods it considers necessary to ensure its continued survival.”172 When parliament and
the executive can simply bypass the judiciary in implementing any policy initiative it
considers “beneficial to the public generally,” then international intervention is necessary
to reinforce the rule of law and prevent further harm by government officials.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR I NTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
¶45

Some scholars argue that the push for the “rule of law” by the human rights
movement – particularly within the U.S. – through funneling money to NGOs and using
military force to curtail human rights violations have been unsuccessful, as evidenced by
the occupations in Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 173 It is critical for the realization
of universally recognized human rights that they be judicially enforceable rather than
hopeful aspirations. International intervention is requisite when a state continually
evinces that it will not uphold its own law, much less comply with its international
obligations. In the case of Zimbabwe, such intervention is absolutely critical, and its
continued violations of international human rights obligations concern the entire
international community.
¶46
The report of the United Nations secretary-general’s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change proposes such intervention and responds to the fact that the
decision- making of intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms are not “divorced” from
the decisions of its members. 174 The High-Level Panel recommends international
170
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intervention through humanitarian aid, monitoring missions, diplomatic pressure, and
military force as a last resort when a state’s authorities are unable or unwilling to protect
its civilians. 175 The underlying premise is that “all signatories of the UN Charter accept a
responsibility both to protect their own citizens and to meet their international obligations
to their fellow nations.”176 This does not mean merely that a state must have a right to
intervene, “but [that it has a] ‘responsibility to protect’ . . . when it comes to people
suffering from avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by
forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.”177 The
idea implies that participation in the U.N. itself requires member states to intervene when
the “responsibility to protect” is implicated and not fulfilled, despite whether member
states favor non- intervention or not. 178
¶47
Though intervention requires evidence of a threat to international peace and
security, non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect also when there are
breaches of international law. 179 With direct evidence that the Operation has caused
starvation, disease outbreaks, and deaths reported by the U.N. Special Envoy, the
“serious violation[s] of international humanitarian law”180 per se justify international
response and intervention. This argument was endorsed by the High- Level Panel, as it
noted that “sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent” 181
serious violations of international human rights law.
¶48
It is evident from the analysis in section III that the government of Zimbabwe has
violated the right to adequate housing and prohibition of forced evictions without due
process specified in the Universal Declaration, the CESCR, and the ICCPR, and its
unwillingness to accommodate the displaced has subjected its citizens to further human
rights violations. Moreover, the Human Rights and ESCR Commissions have been
largely ineffective in enforcing member states’ treaty obligations. It is therefore
imperative that the U.N. give teeth to its human rights provisions by compelling member
states to take action and enforce compliance in Zimbabwe.
¶49
In addition, because 570,000 individuals have been rendered homeless182 without
adequate shelter, food, clean water, or health care as a direct result of the actions of their
own government, the “responsibility to protect” is clearly implicated. Though the
government has attempted to respond to the humanitarian crises it created by launching
“Operation Gerikai” – reconstruction and rebuilding – by giving plots of land to the
displaced so they may build new homes, “the scale of the problem is too large and
exceeds the present ability of the Government to address the basic needs of those affected
by Operation Restore Order.”183 Indeed, with 2.4 million people in need of food aid, 184
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“chronic budget deficits, a strained fiscal base and hyperinflation[,] observers are critical
about whether Operation Garikai will materialize.”185 Consistent with the High- Level
Panel’s recommendations, the U.N. “must now subordinate state security for human
security,”186 and urge member states to intervene in Zimbabwe so that the victims of the
Operation can seek redress and protection from a government that is wholly apathetic to
their suffering.
VI. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
¶50

The unplanned and chaotic execution of Operation Murambastvina has caused
avoidable and untold human suffering for more than half a million of Zimbabwe’s most
vulnerable population. In such a crisis, it is difficult to determine the most effective
means of reconciliation. Though international human rights law recognizes the right of
individuals to protection from the arbitrary deprivation of property by their state, the
enforcement mechanisms are completely ineffective when a government is unwilling to
adhere to its international obligations. Coupled with the failure of Zimbabwe’s domestic
legal system, and the inability of the judiciary to apply the law without succumbing to
intimidation by Mugabe and ZANU-PF, there are few alternatives other than some
substantial form of international intervention.
¶51
Sustainable and coherent strategies to immediately remedy the housing problem are
available with the help of the international community. These would include: (1)
“rewrit[ing] building codes and zoning regulations to standards attainable by low- income
groups”; (2) providing “inexpensive building materials, common components, fixtures
and fittings” in support of “Operation Garikai”; (3) urban planning that would utilize
underdeveloped and vacant land to “secure available housing sites as legal alternatives to
squatter settlements (as Managua, Nicaragua and Several Tunisian cities have done), [that
would] ensure sufficient space for recreation and good connections to employment or
income for lower- income groups”; and finally (4) “chang[ing] finance systems so that
inexpensive loans are available to low- income and community groups without unrealistic
demands for collateral.”187 In addition, the implementation of a truth and reconciliation
commission to remedy the systematic abuses inflicted on the citizens of Zimbabwe by
their government is another possibility. 188
¶52
Indeed, redressing the abuses stemming from the Operation through international
intervention by implementing some of these strategies is only the first step in preventing
future human rights abuses by Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Zimbabwean decision- makers
have prove n not only irresponsible in setting a sustainable fiscal course for the country,
of foreign exchange implies that it is highly unlikely that Government will be able to fulfill basic food
requirements without substantial external assistance.”).
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but have shown complete disregard for the well-being of their citizens during the
implementation of every state sponsored policy initiative since Zimbabwe’s
independence. Operation Murambatsvina and the subsequent nonfeasance on the part of
government officials must be the last time the international community stands aside while
the government of Zimbabwe inflicts mass suffering on its citizens. 189 Operation
Murambatsvina and the subsequent nonfeasance on the part of government officials must
be the last time the international community stands aside while the government of
Zimbabwe inflicts mass suffering on its citizens. 190
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